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CORPORATIONS - FIDUCIARY DUTY - CIRCUMSTANCES
HELD NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUSPICIOUS TO INVOKE MAJORITY STOCKHOLDER'S DUTY TO INVESTIGATE PURCHASERS
PRIOR TO SALE OF STOCK. CLAGETT v. HUTCHISON, 583 F.2d
1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Clagett v. Hutchison,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that a majority controlling stockholder owes
a duty to minority stockholders to investigate the moral character
and financial status of potential purchasers of his shares of stock
where the circumstances surrounding the transfer would arouse the
suspicions of a reasonable person as to the likelihood of fraud on the
corporation or the remaining minority stockholders.2 In the instant
case, the court held that the circumstances surrounding the sale of
the majority shares of stock were not sufficiently suspicious to
indicate the likelihood of fraud, and therefore the seller was not
under a duty to investigate. 3 In addition, the court ruled that the

1. 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
2. Id. at 1262. This rule, now widely accepted, was originally promulgated in the
leading case of Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F.
Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
3. 583 F.2d at 1262. Under the early view, a majority stockholder was not held to be
under a fiduciary duty when selling his stock to outsiders. Recently, however,
courts have recognized that a majority or controlling stockholder in a
corporation may occupy a fiduciary relationship toward the minority. The nature
of this relationship and the extent of its attendant duties have not been clearly
defined. Consequently, a majority stockholder wishing to sell his stock is often
without a clear understanding of his duty to minority stockholders. See, e.g.,
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S.
483, 491-92 (1919); Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577-78 (4th Cir. 1973);
McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969); Seagrave Corp. v. Mount,
212 F.2d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 1954); Box v. Northrop Corp., 459 F. Supp. 540, 547
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1157 (D. Kan. 1974),
aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975); Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v.
Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1940); DeBaun v. First
Western Bank and Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 696, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359-60
(1975); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81
Cal. Rptr. 592, 599 (1969); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 650 (1941). See
generally H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 240-41 (2d ed. 1970); W. KNEPPER,
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS & DIRECTORS § 1.02 (2d ed. 1973); Note,
Fiduciary Duties of Majority or Controlling Stockholders, 44 IOWA L. REV. 734
(1959); Note, The FiduciaryDuty of ControllingShareholders,7 W. RES. L. REV.
467 (1956).
For a discussion of the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors, see
generally H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 235 (2d ed. 1970); W. KNEPPER,
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS & DIRECTORS § 1.02 (2d ed. 1973); Miller, The
Fiduciary Duties of a Corporate Director, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 259 (1975).
Questions frequently arise as to the duty of a majority or controlling
stockholder with respect to management of corporate property. For a discussion
of the history and issues involved in claims of mismanagement by a majority
stockholder see Note, The FiduciaryDuty of ControllingShareholders,7 W. RES.
L. REV. 467, 470-75 (1956).
This casenote does not consider the dominant shareholder's accountability to
the minority for any profit or bonus received when selling his stock to outsiders.
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seller of a controlling block of shares does not owe a duty to minority
shareholders to afford them an equal opportunity to sell their shares,
or a pro rata portion of their shares, on the same terms as the
4
majority stockholder.
II. THE FACTS
Defendant Richard Hutchison, Jr., president and controlling
shareholder of Laurel Harness Racing Association, Inc.,5 a Maryland corporation, entered into an agreement with Steven and James
Sobecko and Joseph Shamy, also defendants in this suit, to sell them
his stock for $43.75 a share. 6 The prevailing market price of the stock
fluctuated between $7.50 and $10.00 a share, thus securing for
Hutchison a sale price approximately 400% over the market price.7
Hutchison also caused the buyers' offer to be extended to a
designated group of minority shareholders." The closing of the
transfer was not to occur for six to twelve months after the
agreement to sell.9 Additionally, the seller agreed to preserve the
financial condition of Laurel pending the transfer.10 Plaintiffs, those
minority shareholders not included in the sale, were not alerted to

For a discussion of cases concerning this issue see Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 738
(1971). There are generally two forms of relief available when a majority or
controlling stockholder breaches his duty of care: accountings for excess profits
and damages. Where the amount of looting is greater than the amount of the
premium, accounting for excess profits will not adequately compensate the
plaintiffs. Some courts, therefore, award damages equal to the injury caused by
the breach. "To hold a seller liable only for the premium he received for selling
control would allow him a worthwhile gamble, with nothing to lose but the profit
he would make if not caught." Note, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1234 n.1 (1973). See also F.
O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 4.06 (1975) (remedies under
Rule lOb-5). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1977).
4. 583 F.2d at 1263-64. See generally Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Controlling Shares:A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 420 (1965);
Note, Duties of Controlling Shareholders in TransferringTheir Shares, 54 HARV.

L.

REV.

648 (1941).

5. See text accompanying notes 82-87 infra.
6. During the period in controversy there were 125,000 shares of common stock
issued and outstanding. These shares were held by approximately 300
stockholders and only thinly traded on the public market. 583 F.2d at 1261.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The delay in closing was predicated upon the receipt of a loan through a pledge
of personal assets on the part of the purchasers. Id. at 1262.
10.
Hutchison covenanted that pending closing: Laurel's business would be
conducted only in the ordinary course; no change would be made in
Laurel's charter, by-laws or issued and outstanding shares; no dividend
would be paid in excess of that declared in 1974; no increase would be
made in officer or employee compensation; no contract or commitment
extending beyond August 31, 1975 would be made on behalf of Laurel;
and Hutchison's best efforts would be used to preserve Laurel's business
organization intact.
Brief for Appellant at 5, Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
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the pending transfer, but discovered it shortly before closing through
a newspaper article.1 1
The Sobeckos and Shamy subsequently transferred a portion of
their shares to defendant Brown, and these four later transferred the
entire block of shares to defendant Rizk. 12 The plaintiffs brought suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
alleging that the purchasers diverted corporate funds to their
personal use, thereby causing a dimunition in the value of the
plaintiffs' stock.1 3 More particularly, the plaintiffs alleged that
defendant Hutchison breached his fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholders by failing
to investigate the purchasers of his
4
1
controlling interest.

Defendant Hutchison moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that under Maryland law there was no fiduciary relationship
between a controlling stockholder and minority stockholders with respect to ownership of stock, and that, consequently, he was under no
duty to investigate potential purchasers of his stock. 15 In support of
6 which,
this contention, Hutchison relied upon Goodman v. Poland,1
although holding that no fiduciary relationship exists between
majority and minority stockholders, was decided in the context of
the purchase of stock from minority shareholders. The court in
Goodman held that under Maryland law a majority stockholder
owes no duty to a minority stockholder to disclose inside information
when purchasing the minority stockholders' shares. 17 The district
court stated that Goodman was not dispositive of the issue of
whether a majority controlling stockholder owes a fiduciary duty to
the minority stockholder when selling his stock. '

11. 583 F.2d at 1261.
12. With respect to the stock transfer to Brown, the court stated that as there was no
allegation of a transfer of control, there could be no duty to investigate. As to the
later transfer to Rizk, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that there
were no allegations of suspicious circumstances upon which to place a duty to
investigate. 583 F.2d at 1263.
13. The plaintiffs alleged that the Sobeckos and Shamy looted the corporation's
assets by causing it to make unsecured, interest-free loans to themselves and
others in amounts totaling $200,000, diverting a $75,000 payment made to
Laurel, causing Laurel to pay attorneys' fees to Shamy in an amount much
greater than incurred in prior years, and causing Laurel to pay to themselves
and others salaries and compensation in amounts substantially greater than
that paid in prior years. Brief for Appellant at 6, Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d
1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
14. 583 F.2d at 1261. Brief for appellant at 2, Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th
Cir. 1978).
15. Clagett v. Hutchison, No. HM76-1204 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 1977).
16. 395 F. Supp. 660 (D. Md. 1975).
17. Id. at 680-81.
18. Clagett v. Hutchison, No. HM76-1204, slip op. at 3 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 1977).
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The trial court found that a majority controlling stockholder
may owe a duty to minority stockholders. 19 Nonetheless, the court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the
circumstances alleged by the plaintiffs were insufficient to invoke a
seller's duty to investigate. 20 The circumstances alleged to have been
indicative of the likelihood of fraud were (1) payment of a premium
sale price for the controlling block of shares; (2) delay of the closing
of the transaction for six to twelve months after the initial
agreement; (3) an agreement to preserve the financial condition of
the corporation pending closing; and (4) designation of a select group
of minority shareholders to participate in the sale. 2 1 In addition, the
court declined to adopt the equal opportunity rule. 22 The Fourth

23
Circuit, Judge Butzner dissenting, affirmed the decision.
The remainder of this Note will examine the nature and scope of
the fiduciary relationship between majority controlling stockholders
and minority stockholders, particularly as viewed in light of the
Clagett decision.

III. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
A.

The Existence of the Duty

Shares of stock are the private property of shareholders and are
generally accorded free alienability. 24 Thus, under ordinary circum19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 5.
Id.
583 F.2d at 1261.
583 F.2d at 1264. The court noted in a footnote that this case presented a
corollary issue to the equal opportunity rule - whether a majority stockholder
can make an offer available to some of the minority stockholders, but not to
others. Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp. 354, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), suggests that it
may create a cause of action under Rule 10b-5. The Clagettcourt, however, found
that the plaintiffs in Clagett had no standing to raise this issue under MD. CORP.
& Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-301, which is virtually identical to rule 10b-5, because
that statute protects an injured buyer of securities. "In similar vein, we find no
support in existing case law for importation of a Ferraioli-inspired common law
cause of action where plaintiffs have neither purchased nor sold their stock in
reliance upon alleged misconduct." 583 F.2d at 1264 n.5. See generally Brune,
Rule 10b-5 and the General Law as to Deceit in Securities Transactions in
Maryland, 33 MD. L. REV. 129, 138-41 (1975).
23. 583 F.2d at 1260.
24. E.g., Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1157 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d
1333 (10th Cir. 1975); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 649 (1941). See
generally Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares:A Reply
to ProfessorAndrews, 32 U. CHi. L. REV. 420 (1965); Note, The FiduciaryDuty of
Controlling Shareholders, 7 W. RES. L. REV. 467, 476 (1956).
Business convenience and the concept of private property mandate the free
alienability of shares of stock, but as ownership of the majority block of shares
entails the power to control the corporation, some restraints are necessary to
protect the minority from a fraudulent sale of that control. Note, Duties of
Controlling Shareholders in Transferring Their Shares, 54 HARV. L. REV. 648
(1941); Note, The FiduciaryDuty of Controlling Shareholders, 7 W. RES. L. REV.
467, 476 (1956). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1977).
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stances, an owner of stock may sell his shares at any time and for
any price. 25 Such a rule has broad implications when a majority
stockholder wishes to sell his stock, for the nature of a corporation
often clothes one individual, by virtue of his ownership of a majority
block of shares, with the inherent power to exert control over the
property of others. 26 It is this position of control that has been held
27
to create a fiduciary duty on the part of a majority stockholder, and
28
not the mere ownership of stock. This fiduciary relation, coupled

25. E.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973); McDaniel v.
Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969); Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68, 69 (10th
Cir. 1937); Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1158 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975); Tyron v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 178, 229 P.2d 251, 254
(1951); Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 43, 181 S.E. 897, 911 (1935). See
generally 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 900 (perm. ed. 1970).
26. The essence of the majority shareholder's control comes from his ability to vote
his shares to elect the board of directors who, in turn, are vested with
management of the corporate business. In that respect, the majority shareholder
can control the corporation and its assets. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622,
649 (1941). See generally H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 188-89 (2d ed.
1970); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control,50 CORNELL L.Q. 628
(1965).
The term "majority" can also connote the "effective control" exercised over
corporate affairs by use of proxy or by capitalizing upon widespread stockholder
apathy. Note, The FiduciaryDuty of ControllingShareholders,7 W. RES. L. REV.
467, 468 (1956).
In Clagett, Hutchison occupied the dual fiduciary roles of president and
majority stockholder, a position giving him almost virtual control over the
corporation.
27. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919).
In the sense that the business which a majority stockholder transacts is
for the benefit of the corporation or the minority shareholders, he acts in
a fiduciary capacity. In this capacity, the majority shareholder stands in
a relation of trust and confidence, and owes a high degree of good faith.
Note, The FiduciaryDuty of ControllingShareholders,7 W. RES. L. REV. 467, 468
(1956).
28. E.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973); Harman v.
Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1158 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir.
1975); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 649 (1941).
[A] dominant or majority stockholder does not become a fiduciary for
other shareholders by reason of mere ownership of stock. It is only when
one steps out of the role as a stockholder and acts in the corporate
management, with disregard for the interests and welfare of the
corporation and its stockholders that he assumes the burden of fiducial
responsibility.
McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969). See generally 13 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5805 (perm.

ed. 1970).
Traditionally, the sale of stock has been considered a private act, as opposed
to those acts done on behalf of the corporation. See Ace Development Co., v.
Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 76 A.2d 566 (1950); Llewellyn v. Queen City Dairy, Inc.,
187 Md. 49, 48 A.2d 322 (1946). In-Llewellyn, the court held that the defendants,
directors of the corporation, were not acting for or on behalf of the corporation in
the purchase of stock, but were acting as individuals and, therefore, had a right
to make the purchases. Id. at 61, 48 A.2d at 328.
Ordinarily, a director possesses the same right as any other stockholder
to deal freely with his shares of stock and to dispose of them at such a
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with concepts of fundamental fairness, imposes restraints on a
controlling stockholder's otherwise unfettered right to dispose of his

stock.

29

The fiduciary role of the majority stockholder may require that
he take affirmative action to protect the interests of the minority
stockholder. In the leading case of InsuransharesCorp. of Delaware
v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,30 suit was brought against the controlling
group of shareholders in an investment company who sold their
shares to a syndicate that subsequently looted the corporation.
Finding that those in control owe a duty to the corporation with
respect to the transfer of control, the court established the rule which
has become widely accepted: "[T]he owners of control are under a
duty not to transfer control to outsiders [without first conducting a
reasonably adequate investigation] if the circumstances surrounding
the proposed transfer are such as to awaken suspicion and put a
prudent man on his guard
. "31 that fraud is intended or likely to
result.
Because no Maryland statute or decision has addressed directly
the issue posed in Clagett, the court relied on its prior decision in

price as he may be able to obtain, provided the director acts in good
faith, since the corporation as such has no interest in its outstanding
stock or in dealing in its shares among its stockholders. In other words,
the mere fact that a man accepts the position of a director or an official
in a corporation should not as a rule deprive him of his right to dispose
of his stock as he sees fit and to make any profit that he might gain,
provided in the sale of that stock he has done nothing to injure the
corporation and its stockholders.
3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 900 (rev.
perm. ed. 1975). In Ace Development Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 365-66, 76
A.2d 566, 570, the court stated that:
[T]he acts of an agent of a corporation in matters not involving
corporate affairs are separate and distinct from corporate acts even
though such acts may affect the corporation. A director or agent, not
acting as such but in his private capacity, may, in good faith, buy stock
of his corporation ....
Under the early view, each stockholder represented his own interest in corporate
affairs, and thus even a majority stockholder could act upon personal motives
even if his acts were adverse to the interests of the other shareholders. Courts
were particularly emphatic in holding that there was no duty owed when a
majority stockholder sold his shares to outsiders. Note, The Fiduciary Duty of
Controlling Shareholders, 7 W. RES. L. REV. 467, 469 (1956).
29. See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 110, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592, 599 (1969). See generally Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 420 (1965);
Comment, Sales of Corporate Control and the Theory of Overkill, 31 U. CHI. L.
REV. 725 (1964); 9 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 261 (1976).
30. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
31. Id. at 25. The standard established in Insuranshareshas been widely accepted.
E.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577- 78 (4th Cir. 1973); McDaniel v.
Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969); Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d
389, 395 (6th Cir. 1954); Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1157 (D. Kan.
1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975).

19791

Clagett v. Hutchison

347

Swinney v. Keebler Co., 3 2 which recognized that a majority
stockholder owes a duty to minority stockholders under certain
circumstances. The Swinney court, however, acting under the
guidance of Insuranshares, did not impose an absolute duty to
investigate, but rather a qualified one:
[I]f the sellers of control are in a position to foresee the
likelihood of fraud on the corporation, . . . or on the
remaining stockholders, at the hands of the transferee, their
fiduciary duty imposes a positive duty to investigate the
motives and reputation of the would-be purchaser; and
unless such a reasonable investigation shows that to a
reasonable man no fraud is intended or likely to 33result, the
-sellers must refrain from the transfer of control.
Relying upon Swinney, the Clagett court held that a controlling
stockholder may be under a duty to investigate potential purchasers
of his shares of stock.
In theory there are at least three possible standards for invoking
a seller's duty to investigate: (1) no duty absent actual knowledge of
a purchaser's wrongful intent; (2) a duty to investigate where
circumstances suggest the likelihood of fraud; and, (3) an absolute
duty to investigate. The Clagett court adopted the second standard,
ruling that when it is foreseeable to a reasonable person that fraud is
intended or likely to result, the fiduciary relationship requires an
investigation of the purchaser in order to reduce the likelihood of
34
harm befalling the corporation and minority stockholders.
In adopting this standard, the court did not consider the two
alternative positions. One court has stated that no duty to
investigate arises absent actual knowledge of the purchaser's
wrongful intention. 35 This position has been criticized as creating an
atmosphere conducive to fraud by placing "a premium on the 'head

32. 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).

33. Id. at 578 (4th Cir. 1973); 583 F.2d at 1262.
34. 583 F.2d at 1262.
35. Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265 A.D. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942).
A stockholder, in selling his stock to a stranger, is not a trustee for other
stockholders. This would seem to be so though a stockholder sold a
majority of the stock . . . . Of course, a majority stockholder may not
knowingly use his position to wrongfully injure one who holds a
minority interest, and will incur liability when he does so. The test of
common honesty would seem to be a sufficient one to apply in order to
determine when a wrong is being done. To apply the rigid rules limiting
a fiduciary, and to say further that the failure to investigate the moral
character, or financial ability of the purchaser of one's stock is an
actionable wrong, is to place an unwarranted burden upon the
ownership of stock.
Id. at 216, 218; 38 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526.
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in the sand' approach to corporate sales." 3 6 As Judge Friendly
stated, "[t]o hold the seller for delinquencies of the new directors
only if he knew the purchaser was an intending looter is not a
sufficient sanction. ' 37 The other alternative is to impose an absolute
duty upon the seller to investigate whenever he sells stock. This
theory is premised upon the belief that this would avoid the inherent
imprecision of the likelihood standard by eliminating the problem of
determining when circumstances are sufficiently suspicious. 38 The
courts have not been receptive to this view because of the
burdensome effect it would have on
sellers, which could discourage
39
many potentially beneficial sales.
The position taken by the Clagett court is consistent with that
adopted by other jurisdictions that have considered the issue. 40 This
standard offers the greatest possibility for compatibility between the
rights and interests of the parties because it allows the majority
shareholder to retain all rights and benefits inuring to an individual
stockholder, subject only to the requirement that he refrain from
using his position to the detriment of the minority. This standard
also protects the minority from fraudulent acts of the majority
stockholder.
B.

The Imposition of the Duty

Fundamental to a determination of the scope of a seller's duty to
investigate potential purchasers of his stock is a weighing of the
competing interests involved. The Clagett court, following the lead of
other courts that have adopted the likelihood of fraud standard,
chose to favor the interests of the majority stockholder. The Fourth
Circuit's ruling that the circumstances alleged were insufficient to
invoke the duty to investigate illustrates the limited nature of the

36. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 n.6 (4th Cir. 1973).
37. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J.,
concurring).
38. 51 TEX. L. REV. 1234, 1239 (1973). At least one court has suggested that there
may be a duty to investigate even absent suspicious circumstances. See
Northway, Inc. v. T.S.C. Industries, Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 342 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 429 U.S. 810 (1976).
39. The courts have traditionally been reluctant to place any burden on the free
alienability of stock. See generally Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1956);51 TEX. L. REV. 1234, 1238 (1973); Note, The
Fiduciary Duty of Controlling Shareholders, 7 W. RES. L. REV. 467, 480 (1956).
40. E.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973); McDaniel v. Painter,
418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969); Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan.
1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975); Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v.
Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Tyron v. Smith, 191 Ore.
172, 229 P.2d 251 (1951); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941). But see Levy
v. American Beverage Corp., 265 A.D. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942) (holding that a
majority stockholder was not under a fiduciary duty to the minority when selling

his stock).
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duty actually imposed upon a seller of a majority block of shares. 4 1
Although this court, as well as other courts, has failed to articulate
any guidelines for recognizing the existence of suspicious circumstances, it is clear that only a limited set of circumstances will be
considered sufficient to indicate a likelihood of fraud. The mere
possibility of fraud will not suffice to impose a duty on the seller;
there must be a likelihood of fraud. 42 Moreover, what often on its
face purports to be a likelihood standard is, in effect, an imposition
of a duty only where circumstances are so suspicious as to lead to no
43
explanation other than fraud.
The Clagett court's narrow interpretation of the fiduciary duty is
consistent with the heavy burden imposed by the Fourth Circuit in
Swinney v. Keebler Co.4 4 In Swinney, holders of debentures 45
brought suit against the seller of the company for payment of the
debentures or damages resulting from an alleged breach of its duty
to investigate the purchaser. The lower court held the seller liable
based upon the facts shown to be known to the seller at the time of
the sale. 46 The appellate court reversed, holding that the seven
circumstances alleged by the plaintiffs to be indicative of fraud did
not give the seller sufficient knowledge to foresee the likelihood of
fraud, 47 particularly as there were many positive indications of the

41. This is particularly true in view of the fact that this case was dismissed on the
pleadings pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to
dismiss, the allegations of the complaint are to be construed most favorably to
the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). See generally 1 J.
HUNTER, FEDERAL CIVIL RULES IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT § 12 (1975).
In his dissent, Judge Butzner challenged the propriety of the dismissal on
the pleadings, claiming that the majority reached its conclusion by "erroneously
construing the allegations against, rather than in favor of, the complainants."
583 F.2d at 1265.
42. See, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577- 78 (4th Cir. 1973); McDaniel
v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969); Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp.
1149, 1157-58 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975); Insuranshares
Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
43. See 51 TEx. L. REV. 1234, 1241 (1973). The standard imposed, however, need not
meet the actual knowledge standard of Levy v. American Beverage Corp., 265
A.D. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1942).
44. 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).
45. In Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941), the court recognized that creditors
have an interest in the corporation which deserves protection from wrongful acts
by controlling stockholders. The extension of the Insuransharesduty to creditors
"is justified because stockholders have some chance . . . to protect their own
interests. Having no comparable opportunity, creditors must rely on the
judgment and care of those in charge of the corporation." Note, 51 TEx. L. REV.
1234, 1235 (1973).
46. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216, 224 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 573
(4th Cir. 1973).
47. These circumstances were: (1) no one from the purchasers had any experience in
the candy business; (2) at the time the sales contract was executed no one had
inspected the company's operations; (3) by the time of closing, only the
purchaser's accountant had examined the company to any extent; (4) the
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purchaser's good intentions.4 s In so holding, the Swinney court
implied that more than a mere scintilla of evidence of fraud is
required to impose the duty to investigate. 49 The Claggett court also
found "positive" explanations for each allegedly suspicious circumstance and, influenced by the implied quantum of proof requirement
of Swinney, held that the plaintiffs had not pleaded any facts upon
50
which to base recovery.
The first suspicious circumstance alleged by the plaintiffs in
Clagett was that the 400% premium paid to Hutchison was so
exorbitant as to arouse the suspicions of a reasonable person, and
thus warranted an investigation. 51 The Clagett court found that the
premium payment was justified, viewing the premium as the price
paid for control. Speaking for the majority, Judge Hall stated that
"it seems farfetched to pay a 400% premium for stock simply in order
to acquire control of a corporation in order to loot it."52 Furthermore,
the court stated that the premium was justified because "Laurel was
a commercial business subject to further development as an on-going
business. Thus, the premium price paid to Hutchison cannot be said
to be so unreasonable as to place him on notice of the likelihood of
fraud ... -53
It is accepted that the sale of controlling shares of stock for more
than book value is not evidence of fraud because the purchaser of
majority stock is acquiring not only stock, but also control incident
thereto. 54 Generally, a majority stockholder will not be required to
refrain from accepting a premium for his stock. 55 For example, in

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.

company did not have a market of its own and any apparent profits could not be
accepted at face value; (5) no attempt had been made by the purchaser to retain
key employees; (6) the sale had been conducted with dispatch; and (7) the
purchaser had inquired as to the availability of company funds for payment of
the purchase price. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 578 (4th Cir. 1973).
Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 580 (4th Cir. 1973).
See id.
583 F.2d at 1262.
Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1262.
Id.
See, e.g., McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969); Tyron v. Smith,
191 Ore. 172, 180, 229 P.2d 251, 254 (1951).
The most important reason a purchaser might pay a premium for
controlling shares, and one that has to be met squarely, is that an
investment in controlling shares is a more promising, or at least a safer,
investment than one in noncontrolling shares for the simple reason that
it will enable the investor to implement what he believes to be the best
policies in the management of his investment.
Andrews, Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
HARV. L. REV. 505, 526 (1965). According to Professor Andrews, even if the
majority stockholder does not change the management of the corporation,
"control increases the value of the investment by protecting it."
Id.
See Tyron v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 180, 229 P.2d 251, 254 (1951). See generally
Comment, Sales of Corporate Control and the Theory of Overkill, 31 U. CHI. L.
REV. 725 (1964) ("It would be economically unsound to impose liability for the
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5 6
McDaniel v. Painter,
minority shareholders brought an action
against the sellers and purchasers of the majority block of stock,
alleging that their stock had diminished in value as a result of the
seller's failure to investigate the purchasers. That court held that the
sale of controlling stock for a premium was not evidence of fraud
because majority stock is generally more valuable than minority
stock. 57 The rationale underlying cases that have held that price is
not indicative of fraud is that the premium paid
is consideration for
58
control, which attaches to ownership of stock.
Where, however, the premium is paid solely for the element of
control, that is, control which is separate and distinct from
ownership of a majority of stock, the seller will be held liable to the
59
corporation or its minority stockholders for resulting damages.

56.
57.

58.
59.

premium in every case involving a sale of controlling shares."); Javaras, Equal
Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32
U. CHI. L. REV. 420 (1965).
418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 548. In Tyron v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P.2d 251 (1951), former minority
stockholders in the 1st National Bank of Eugene, Oregon brought suit against
Smith, the former president and director, who, with others, owned seventy
percent of the capital stock, to recover for alleged fraud in the sale of stock. The
purchasers bought stock from Smith for $460 per share, but were told by Smith
that they would have to deal directly with the minority stockholders if they
wanted to purchase minority shares. The purchasers proceeded to pay the
minority stockholders $220 per share. The court held that "majority stockholders
may sell their stock at any time and for any price obtainable without informing
other stockholders the price or terms of the sale, provided they act in good faith."
Id. at 178, 229 P.2d at 254. The court also stated that the mere fact that Smith
received more money was not evidence of fraud in view of the general rule that
"majority stock is more valuable than minority stock." Id.
See McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969); Christophides v. Porco,
289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Tyron v. Smith, 191 Ore. 172, 229 P.2d 251
(1951).
See generally Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1957).
The essence of control is the power to choose directors and management of the
corporation, and, therefore, the transfer of control by means other than the sale
of stock should not be condoned. Often, the buyer of the corporation thinks he
can be more successful with the corporation than the old management. In such a
case, the transfer should prove beneficial to all stockholders. It has been argued
that the power going with control is an asset which belongs to the corporation
and payment for that power should go into the corporate treasury. Berle, The
Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 628 (1965). See
generally Comment, Sales of CorporateControl and the Theory of Overkill, 31 U.
CHI. L. REV. 725 (1964); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L.
REV. 1 (1956); H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS §241 (2d ed. 1970); F. O'NEAL,
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 4 (1975).
In Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22
(E.D. Pa. 1940), the defendants maintained that what occurred was a sale of
stock, with the passing of control being merely incidental to the sale. The court
disagreed, stating that "this transaction was a sale of control, to which the stock
sale was requisite, but nevertheless, a secondary matter." Control in that case
entailed power under the bylaws to sell, exchange or transfer all of the securities
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Although no guidelines have been formulated for determining when
price is sufficiently suspicious to invoke the duty to investigate, one
approach of the courts 6° that have held price to be a suspicious
circumstance is to analyze the nature of the corporation and the ease
with which the corporation's assets can be looted.61 Where the assets
are highly liquid, courts are more likely to find an inflated price to be
sufficiently suspicious. For instance, in the leading case of
Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,62 the
court held that the circumstances surrounding the sale of stock were
sufficient to awaken the suspicions of a prudent person. 63 One

in the corporation's portfolio, as well as access to and physical possession of

them. Id. at 24.
Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962), involved a sale of
stock with a provision giving the purchaser an option to require a majority of
existing directors to replace themselves with a majority designated by the
purchaser. The court stated that:
It is established beyond question under New York law that it is illegal to
sell corporate office or management control by itself (that is, accompanied by no stock or insufficient stock to carry voting control) .

60.
61.

62.
63.

. .

. The

rationale of the rule is undisputable: persons enjoying managementcontrol hold it on behalf of the corporation's stockholders, and therefore
may not regard it as their own personal property to dispose of as they
wish.
Id. at 575. Furthermore, the court stated that while it is illegal to sell a corporate
office or management control by itself, it was legal to pay for the immediate
transfer of control to one who has the majority share control but would not
otherwise be able to convert it into operating control for a period of time. Id. at
576.
Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.
Pa. 1940); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941).
Compare Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp.
22 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (investment trust company) and Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28
N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941) (investment company) with Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d
573 (4th Cir. 1973) (candy company).
Although the nature of the corporation's assets was not a determinative
factor in the court's decision in Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (I). Kan.
1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975), the court in its attempt to distinguish
Insuransharesand Gerdes noted that the assets in Harman "were neither easily
salable nor highly liquid, but rather, consisted primarily of real estate and
chattel mortgages." 374 F. Supp. at 1159.
35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
The alleged suspicious circumstances were:
(1) the defendants' probable knowledge that the purchase was to be
financed by a pledge of the corporation's assets, (2) the corporation's
president's clear predisposition to allow a sale to be financed by pledging
those assets as security, (3) the defendant's awareness of the purchaser's
plan to have a large part of the corporation's assets converted into cash
prior to the sale, (4) the inflated price or premium paid for control,
especially given the nature of the business .

. .,

(5) warnings from the

seller's attorneys as to their potential liabilities for dealing with littleknown purchasers, and (6) the fact that the corporation had been looted
five years before by a different group who had gained control by using
the same method of financing.
Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973).
In Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941), sale of the majority's shares of
stock in an investment corporation was held invalid where (1) all officers and
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circumstance cited by that court was the price paid for the stock. The
Insuransharescourt suggested that an inflated price should put a
seller on notice of the likelihood of fraud. 64 The district court in
Clagett distinguished Insuranshareson the basis that it involved an
investment company and thus was "a corporation with the
equivalent of cash at the buyer's fingertips." 65 Similarly, in Gerdes
v. Reynolds, 66 another case involving an investment company with
in
liquid assets, the court held that a premium price was significant
67
determining the existence of suspicious circumstances.
The plaintiffs' second contention was that the six to twelve
month delay in closing was a suspicious circumstance. 68 According
to the plaintiffs, it could be inferred that the purpose of the delay
was to give the purchasers an opportunity to use the agreement and
the shares of Laurel to be purchased as collateral for a loan.6 9 The
court rejected this argument, finding that the agreement was to give
the purchasers time to obtain a personal loan through a pledge of
personal assets in order to finance the purchase of the stock, and
stated that this constituted a prudent business practice. 70 In
contrast, in Insuranshares, where the sale was to be financed
through a pledge of the corporation's assets as security, the court
held that this was a suspicious circumstance 7' and stated,
[I]f Hepburn had good reason to suspect that the purchase
was to be financed in toto with the corporation's assets, it
would be fair warning of the fraudulent nature of the whole
thing. So, in considering whether the circumstances of this
sale called for a real investigation, one matter of importance
is what was known or to be inferred as72 to the manner in
which the purchase was to be financed.

64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

directors were to resign immediately; (2) only a portion of the purchase price had
been paid at the time of the sale; and (3) the sale price was greatly in excess of
the value of the stock.
The court asked why a purchaser would be willing to pay so much for control,
suggesting that such a thought might well occur to the seller. 35 F. Supp. 22, 26
(E.D. Pa. 1940).
Clagett v. Hutchison, No. HM76-1204, slip op. at 6 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 1977). It does
not necessarily follow, however, that whenever a corporation has the "equivalent
of cash at the buyer's fingertips" that price is a suspicious circumstance.
The district court found it significant that the court in Insuransharesstated
that if the corporation in that case "had been an industrial, mining, or
commercial enterprise, whose physical assets and business might have
potentialities which a purchaser might believe he could develop if given control,"
the inflated price would not have been a significant factor in determining the
existence of suspicious circumstances. Id.
28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941).
Id. at 654.
583 F.2d at 1262.
Brief for Appellants at 14, Clagett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir. 1978).
583 F.2d at 1262-63.
35 F. Supp. at 25 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
Id.
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In Swinney v. Keebler Co., 73 however, the Fourth Circuit held that
inquiries made by the purchaser to the seller as to the availability of
the company's funds for payment of the purchase price were
insufficient to require the seller to investigate where the seller made
clear that the sale must be financed with the purchaser's funds and
the purchaser had the 4"apparent ability to finance the transaction
7
with its own monies."
The plaintiffs' third contention was that the agreement to
prevent any changes in the corporation's financial status was a
suspicious circumstance. 75 The court rejected this argument, stating
that far from being sufficiently suspicious to invoke a duty to
investigate "[t]he agreement essentially preserved the status quo of
Laurel .
"..,76
which the court found to be a prudent business

practice. 77
The plaintiffs' final contention was that Hutchison's designation of certain minority stockholders to be included in the sale was a
suspicious circumstance.7 8 The majority disposed of this contention
on the ground that Hutchison was conducting a private transaction
and had the right to include others in it.79 In his dissent, Judge
Butzner disagreed with the majority, reasoning that Hutchison's use
of his position to include other minority shareholders in the sale
justifies an inference "at least at this stage of the proceedings" that
Hutchison foresaw the impending disaster of the corporation. 0
Furthermore, Judge Butzner stated that the court in Insuranshares
Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp.81 "suggests that the
nature of the corporation's business is a factor to be considered in
assessing the majority stockholder's duty to investigate the persons
who wish to acquire control."8 2 In Judge Butzner's opinion, Laurel's
73. 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).
74. Id. at 580. Compare DeBaun v. First Western Bank and Trust Co., 46 Cal. App.
3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1975) (bank was aware that the only funds available
to the purchaser to finance the sale were the assets of the corporation) with
Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).
75. 583 F.2d at 1261-62.
76. Id. at 1263.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1261, 1263.
79. "Selling one's own stock and including others in such a sale is a private act,
sanctioned in law, and not alone 'suspicious'." Id. See Llewellyn v. Queen City
Dairy, Inc., 187 Md. 49, 60, 48 A.2d 322, 327 (1946). Cf. Ace Development Co. v.
Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 365-66, 76 A.2d 566, 569-70 (1950) ("[T]he acts of an
agent of a corporation in matters not involving corporate affairs are separate
and distinct from corporate acts, even though such acts may affect the
corporation.").
80. 583 F.2d at 1266. Judge Butzner argued that "holders of the same class of stock
are to be treated equally by the corporation and its management." Id. Judge
Butzner cited Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 155 Md. 549, 142 A. 885 (1928),
as supportive authority, and believed that this alleged discrimination stated a
claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Id.
81. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940). See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
82. 583 F.2d at 1263 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
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''unique status as a racetrack licensee" dictated the imposition of a
fiduciary duty to investigate in the present case.8 3 Noting that the
operating license was one of the most valuable assets of the
corporation and could be revoked "for any cause whatsoever" by the
Maryland Racing Commission, Judge Butzner stated,
Since the competency and integrity of new owners will have
an important bearing on the future of the corporation, it
seems to me that majority stockholders who sell control of a
race track have a fiduciary obligation to make a sufficient
investigation to assure the minority that the4 license will not
be placed in jeopardy by the new owners.
The Clagett court might justifiably have imposed a duty to
investigate upon Hutchison based on the fact that Laurel was a
gambling operation highly regulated by state law,8 5 which could lose
86

its license if the new owners proved to be incompetent or corrupt.
The majority opinion, however, did not address this factor in

assessing the seller's duty to investigate.
Although there are no established criteria for identifying
circumstances that are sufficiently suspicious to give rise to the duty
to investigate, courts have pointed to several factors.8 7 For instance,
where a corporation had been looted five years earlier by a group
that had financed their purchase of the corporation in the same
general way as the defendants, such a circumstance was deemed to
be highly suspicious. 88 In addition, payment for the mass resigna-

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78B, § 6 (1975 & Supp. 1978) requires all persons conducting
any meeting in the State where horse racing is permitted "for any stake, purse,
or reward" to have a license. Section 10 of the article subjects the license to
regulations and conditions imposed by the Racing Commission and provides for
the suspension or revocation of the license for any cause the Commission deems
sufficient. Section 13 of the article requires each licensee to maintain records of
the owners of stock of the licensee.
[T]he General Assembly has established a broad policy of prohibiting
the commercial exploitation of the public's gambling instinct. . . . It is
apparent that the legislature deliberately imposed grave responsibility
upon the Racing Commission in order that this exception to the
antigambling laws of the State be kept within proper limits.
Southern Maryland Agricultural Ass'n of Prince George's County v. Magruder,
198 Md. 274, 279-80, 81 A.2d 592, 594 (1951).
86. 583 F.2d at 1267.
87. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1977); 9 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 261
(1976).
88. Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.
Pa. 1940). Noting that the seller had knowledge of all of the details of the prior
looting, the court stated that "[tlhis, of course, is not proof that new group
would do the same thing, but it certainly was a vivid reminder of the special
dangers to which these small and helpless investment trusts were constantly
exposed." Id. at 25.
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tion of the board of directors has also been found to be indicative of
fraud where the purchaser bargains for immediate control and not
merely the right incident to the ownership of the majority of the
stock.89 One court has cited the occurrence of other fraudulent acts
by the same purchaser as giving rise to the investigative duty 0
After a review of those cases that have found that such a duty exists,
one is left with the impression that no single circumstance controls,
but rather that a court will view the entire tenor of the transaction to
determine whether to impose the duty to investigate. Once the duty
is found to exist, the resulting investigation must satisfy a
reasonable man that no fraud was intended or likely to result.9 1
IV. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
The second theory upon which the plaintiffs predicated their
right of recovery was that Hutchison, as majority stockholder, owed
a fiduciary duty to the minority stockholders to afford them an equal
opportunity to sell their shares, or a pro rata portion of their shares,
on the same terms offered to Hutchison. 92 The court rejected this
however, and distinguished the cases upon which it was
contention,
93
based.

89. Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1941). Generally no illegality will be found
in the mere fact of a sale of a majority change in the personality of those
who by reason of stock ownership have the right to choose the
directorate. In this case, however, it indisputably was a condition of the
sale that all the officers and directors then in office should forthwith
resign and that under their power to fill vacancies they should forthwith
elect an entirely new directorate chosen wholly by the purchaser of the
stock. . . . Immediate and complete control in advance of payment...
was thus specifically bargained for and accorded. The officers and
directors were made specifically aware of the fact that what the
purchaser.. . wanted was immediate and actual control, and not merely
the right to elect directors which incidentally follows from a sale of a
majority of voting stock.
Id. at 651. See also Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
See generally, F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 4.02 (1975).
90. DeBaun v. First Western Bank and Trust Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1975). The Court in DeBaun held the seller liable for failure to investigate
citing several circumstances that should have alerted the seller as to the
likelihood of fraud: (1) the Dun & Bradstreet report revealed the failure of prior
entities controlled by the purchaser; (2) The Bank knew that the purchaser would
use the corporation's assets to finance the sale; (3) an officer in the Bank had
personal knowledge that the purchaser had been guilty of a fraud on the Bank's
predecessor in interest on at least one occassion. Id. at 697, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
91. Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973); Harman v. Willbern,
374 F. Supp. 1149, 1158 (D. Kan. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975);
Insuranshares Corp. of Delaware v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 25
(E.D. Pa. 1940).
92. 583 F.2d at 1263.
93. The plaintiffs claimed "that the equal opportunity rule should properly follow
from Maryland law which prohibits a controlling stockholder from using his
control for some ulterior purpose adverse to the interests of the corporation and
its stockholders." Id. See, e.g., Baker v. Standard Lime and Stone Co., 203 Md.
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In at least one case, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New
England, Inc.,94 it was held that the failure of controlling shareholders to offer minority shareholders an equal opportunity to sell
their shares constitutes a breach of their fiduciary duty. Donahue,
however, involved the majority shareholders' use of their voting
power to cause the corporation to redeem their shares. More
importantly, it involved a close corporation. The Donahue court
stressed that a close corporation requires a more rigorous application
of the fiduciary duty of directors and shareholders than do other
corporations and stated that where the stockholder whose shares
were being purchased was a member of a controlling group in a close
corporation, the controlling shareholder must cause the corporation
5
to offer each shareholder an equal opportunity to sell his sharesY
Clagett did not involve a close corporation, nor did it involve the
majority shareholder's use of his voting power to cause the
corporation to act to the detriment of the minority.
The Clagett court noted that the equal opportunity rule has been
soundly rejected, 96 citing McDaniel v. Painter,97 in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that majority

94.
95.
96.

97.

270, 283, 100 A.2d 822, 829 (1953) (dictum); Cooperative Milk Service, Inc. v.
Hepner, 198 Md. 104, 81 A.2d 219 (1951).
The plaintiffs also cited three cases from other jurisdictions in support of the
rule. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass.
578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). The district court distinguished all three cases,
ultimately rejecting the adoption of the equal opportunity rule.
In Jones, the defendants created a holding company to which they sold their
shares. They subsequently turned the holding company public. The minority
shareholders were not offered an equal opportunity to sell their stock to the
holding company before it went public. "The course they chose affected the
minority stockholders with no less finality than does dissolution.
... 1 Cal. 3d
at 115, 460 P.2d at 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 604. At least one commentator has
suggested that Jones supports adoption of the equal opportunity rule. See W.
KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS & DIRECTORS § 6.04 (2d ed. 1973).
Perlman involved the sale of stock of a corporation engaged in producing
steel sheets for sale to manufacturers of steel products. Feldmann, the director
and dominant shareholder of the corporation, sold his stock to a corporation that
was an end-user of steel. The court found that the sale, which took place in the
face of a steel shortage precipitated by the Korean War, was not a mere sale of
stock, but was an unlawful sale of control. The court stated that the purchasers
were interested in obtaining a continuing source of steel, and predicated liability
upon misappropriation of a corporate asset. Feldmann was held accountable to
the minority shareholders to the extent that the price paid represented the right
to control the distribution of the corporate asset.
367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). The opinion in Donahue affords a good
discussion of the nature of a close corporation.
367 Mass. at 598, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
But see Andrews, Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of
Shares, 78 HARV. L. REv. 505 (1965) (Professor Andrews believes that the vitality
of a free market and the purpose that it serves are enhanced rather than
impaired by equal opportunity).
418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969).
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stockholders do not have to make an offer to purchase ratably
available to all stockholders particularly when the sale is made in
good faith. "To condemn the kind of transaction involved in this
case would tend strongly to discourage stock investments and would
be a menace to the efficient management of corporate business."98
As one court has stated, "there is no obligation to share and share
alike." 99

V. CONCLUSION
Early case law held that a controlling shareholder owed no duty
to minority shareholders with respect to the sale of his stock. A
constantly growing and increasingly complex securities market,
however, forced the courts to reexamine their earlier position. Today,
the courts recognize that a majority-controlling stockholder owes a
fiduciary duty to the minority. One consequence of this duty is that
the right of a majority-controlling stockholder to sell his shares at
any time and for any price to anyone he chooses is circumscribed by
the requirement that he not do so if circumstances surrounding the
transfer would alert the suspicions of a prudent person as to the
likelihood of fraud.
The Clagett case revealed that only a limited set of circumstances will give rise to the duty to investigate. The standard is a difficult one for a plaintiff to surmount because if the defendant can
justify his failure to investigate questionable circumstances, courts
are likely to find that no duty arises. Thus, the final determination
in any situation remains to be decided on a case by case basis.
Nevertheless, the practicing attorney representing a client who
wishes to divest himself of his controlling stock ought to be
cognizant of the potential liability attendant to such transfers.
Sherry A. Aarons
98. Id. at 548.
99. Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

